This article discusses the early advaitin view of dreaming, Specifically sankara's and gaudapada's, And analyzes the advaitin view in relation to that of contemporary western dream psychology. Advaitins emphasize that dreams spring from waking experiences, But are also imaginative reconstructions of them. Both waking and dream seduce us into thinking appearances are real, But both ultimately only point to the non-Dual reality, Brahman.

The present volumeis an annotated biblography of the vedik- Laksana, the esitence of which could be determined on the basic of printed editions, catalogues of manuscripts, and citations in other texts. the incentive for compiling this bibliography grew out of an awareness that hardly any relaible information exists concerning manuscripts of veda-laksana texts, although they are of great use critical studies of vedic texts. The goal of this work is to provide a comprehensive handbook of source materials on Veda-Laksna by (...) identifying and distinguishing the texts in various manuscripts and printed editions according to their contents and actual title. (shrink)

The trajectory taken by Advaita Vedānta as a subject of academic discourse over the greater part of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first has provided students of Indian philosophy with valuable insight into not only the range of issues with which Advaita is concerned but also the intellectual presuppositions, commitments, and agendas of both Advaitic scholars and apologists.1 The resulting variety of interpretations affords continuing opportunities to reflect on the ways in which academic research into Advaita (...) Vedānta has served to elucidate, and in some cases reconstitute, the object of its study. In what follows, I will be concerned with the extent to which such reflection bears on the role of .. (shrink)

It is commonly taken for granted that in Vedānta, as also in Indian philosophy in general, yukti, anumāna, and tarka, translate into “reason” (of Western thought) while śruti is rendered as “revelation.” I reject this translation-interpretation; it is a good example of theway in which Sanskrit philosophical discourse is often misconstrued. The term śruti does not refer to revelation, nor do yukti, anumāna, or tarka to reason. Reason, I argue, comprehends all the pramānas; these are all means of legitimizing beliefs. (...) I distinguish between different levels of the application of “reason,” and I maintain that the mere reasoner (tārkika) has not grasped the true nature of “reason.” In effect, I maintain that śabda, both lauika and alukika, is a component of reason, and so is perception. There is no concept of “revelation” in Indian philosophy, and no opposition between reason and experience. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Studies in Advaita Vedanta: Towards an Advaita Theory of ConsciousnessChakravarthi Ram-PrasadStudies in Advaita Vedanta: Towards an Advaita Theory of Consciousness. By Sukharanjan Saha. Kolkata: Jadavpur University, 2004. Pp. 231.Studies in Advaita Vedanta: Towards an Advaita Theory of Consciousness, by Sukhar-anjan Saha, is a collection of papers each of which has something to say about consciousness in Advaita, although (...) some of the papers have a rather tenuous connection to this theme. Saha brings to bear a lifetime of study of Advaita and its philosophical contexts in these essays. The one notable lacuna in his approach is the tendency to ignore virtually all contemporary literature on Advaita, and to concentrate almost entirely on the original Sanskrit texts themselves—although he is clearly at home in a variety of modern philosophical techniques. His views are, in themselves, interesting and carefully spelled out.In "The Many Faces of the 'I,' " Saha draws on well-known uses of aham in Śaṅkara, Vācaspati, and Padmapāda to draw the larger conclusion that Advaita is willing to allow for multiple, context-variant senses of 'I,' in contrast to both a Naiyāyika like Gadhādhara and Western thinkers like Husserl."Advaita Analysis of Suffering" is an elegant and surprising essay. Much of it appears to be a fairly general survey of the manner in which different Hindu and Buddhist thinkers identify a positive cognitive error in understanding reality—avidyā—as the cause of suffering. But Saha notes that the classical consensus on suffering is not an empirical statement; there are ordinary success stories, after all. He then ingeniously uses this fact to show that suffering is something structural to existence. Śaṅkara's example of someone who feels "I am fair-complexioned" is a smug indication of the suffering brought to bear on others who are not, in a society that favors fair complexion. Suffering, Saha argues, is socially relative; it relates to value structures more than mere physical discomfort. If all were of the highest or lowest varna, there would be neither pride nor striving, neither bragging nor lamenting. The metaphysical discussion on suffering, it turns out, is really a commentary on Hindu society.Saha heroically—in the light of modern, especially Western scholarship, which sees Śaṅkara as an arch-conservative proponent of brahminical values—tends to see the Advaitin as a social reformer. In the essay above, he sees ś an.kara as teaching precisely the social lesson against discrimination when he talks of suffering. Saha returns to this theme in "Śaṅkara and Varna Distinctions in Hinduism." He puts forward the argument that since Śaṅkara held that all social distinctions were not ultimate (pāramārthika), and since class/varna distinctions are social ones while liberating knowledge is ultimate, varna is irrelevant to liberation. How those traditionally excluded from brahminical philosophy will respond to this generosity is another matter. [End Page 107]In "Inner Sense and Higher Order Consciousness," Saha usefully explains how Nyāya takes an awareness of awareness to be a matter of inner sense, while Advaita denies this. It is sometimes hard to follow him through the essay, as it is not always clear what is being argued. But the contours of the standard Nyāya and Advaita positions on putative higher-order consciousness are laid out competently. The Nyāya position is clear enough, in that the higher-order awareness is an inner perception, with the mind playing the role of an 'inner' organ for the self. So the self becomes conscious of an object through the mind, and that act of consciousness itself becomes an object of the mind; in the latter instance, the mind functions to generate a higher-order consciousness, taking the first mental state as its object. This is relatively clear, but puts a great burden on Nyāya to give a cogent theory of mind, such that the idea of the mind as an inner sense organ becomes persuasive. But this challenge lies beyond the scope of Saha's essay.Gradually, Saha's argument emerges. Advaita takes the mind to be separate from consciousness, which is the untouched ātman. So, there may well be mental... (shrink)

The quest for self knowledge is pervasive in indian thought and is a central concern of advaita vedanta--The non-Dualistic system expounded primarily by samkara. The article explicates the advaitic conception of the self in its two primary dimensions: self and the empirical self. Arguments used to demonstrate the supreme self are critically appraised and the various theories which seek to explain the relation that obtains between the supreme self and the empirical self are examined. The advaitic analysis of (...) the empirical self is interpreted to be a "phenomenology of consciousness." it is argued that advaita vedanta does not so much explain the self as it describes the process by which we come to believe that it exists. The four levels of consciousness identified by advaita are then analyzed in terms of their respective ontological contexts and epistemological contents. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to examine the indian theory of perception given best expression, According to the author, In the school of advaita vedanta. The peculiarity of the indian view is that it is quite unlike the representative theories current in the west. It can best be described as a "presentative" theory, Wherein the mind ("antahkarana") is presented directly with the object, Without the necessary mediation of sense-Organs. The "antahkarana" ('inner-Vehicle'), Unlike the 'mind' of locke, Is (...) not a passive recipient of "data", It is an active instrument ("pramana") in the process of perceiving. The advaita school maintains that the "antahkarana" 'goes out' through the respective sense-Organs (e.G., The eyes), Pervades the object of attention and transforms itself into the form of the object. The study also considers possible criticism of this theory in light of contemporary discussion of perception. (edited). (shrink)

These are the working notes/handouts given to the resident philosophers and scholars for the de Nobili Endowment Lecture held at Chennai, on 27th October, 2022. These have been printed and circulated among the attendees before the lecture. The lecture itself will be published in a book form. The de Nobili Endowment Lecture was given by the author at Satya Nilayam International Jesuit Centre for Philosophical Excellence affiliated to the University of Madras and which is part of Loyola (Autonomous) College, Chennai (...) on 27th October, 2022 at 6.20 pm in an offline event. The main contention of the paper is that Dr. Edith Stein through her work on Empathy resolves problems of Empathy encountered in Advaita Vedanta. (shrink)

Advaita Vedanta and Madhyamika Buddhism. Eastern Religions in Western Thought. M.A. Cherian, published by the author, Broadstairs, Kent 1988. 195 pp. No price given.

Explores deep sleep (susupti), one of the three states of consciousness in Advaita Vedanta, and the major role it plays in this philosophy.

The idea of creation as the free, spontaneous, and joyous play (līlā) of the gods has been a pervasive motif in Indian thought since Vedic times. In the tradition of Advaita Vedānta, however, where the sole Reality is Brahman alone, divine playfulness is given an illusionistic interpretation and līlā becomes an expression of the deceptive power of māyā.

This paper takes contemporary attempts to engage South and East Asian philosophies regarding their conceptual resources for addressing environmental philosophical problems as an opportunity to discuss the concept of nature within the tradition of classical Advaita Vedānta. Initially, the ambiguity of the European concept of nature and corresponding equivalents in the Indian context are outlined. Subsequently, a widespread interpretation is reconstructed, which regards Śaṅkara’s non-dual Vedānta as an illusionistic variant of akosmian monism and cites this ontology as evidence that (...) such an understanding of nature can only lead to alienation from and contempt for the natural world. Even if this interpretation proves correct under certain conditions, it overlooks the fact that the ambiguity embedded in the Western term “nature”—as the totality of phenomena (jagat, prakṛti, nāmarūpa, māyā) on the one hand, and as the essence of this totality (svabhāva) on the other—in Śaṅkara’s Vedānta does not pertain to an ontological problem but to a methodological strategy of non-dual philosophy. (shrink)

The oldest preserved commentary on the Br̥hadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad was composed by Śaṅkara. Sureśvara composed a sub-commentary on this commentary, while Ānandagiri composed commentaries both on Śaṅkara’s commentary and on Sureśvara’s sub-commentary. All these four books contain a number of passages from earlier works which are not preserved. Sureśvara and Ānandagiri attributed some of these passages to a commentator named Bhartr̥prapañca. The aim of this article is to present a philological method which will establish which of the passages might be paraphrases and (...) which might be quotations from Bhartr̥prapañca’s lost commentary composed in the scope of the bhedābheda theory. This article will argue that Śaṅkara paraphrases Bhartr̥prapañca’s text, while Ānandagiri quotes most probably Bhartr̥prapañca’s text literally. This text was metrically adjusted by Sureśvara who paraphrases Bhartr̥prapañca by shortening and adjusting the original text in order to fit into the pattern of the śloka meter. If this is true, it is possible to establish a methodology which may help us to reconstruct portions of the oldest known commentary on the Br̥hadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad. (shrink)

Introduction: Experiential deconstructive inquiry -- Foundational philosophies and spiritual methods -- Non-duality in Advaita Vedanta and Zen Buddhism -- Ontological differences and non-duality -- Meditative inquiry, questioning, and dialoguing as a means to spiritual insight -- The undoing or deconstruction of dualistic conceptions -- Advaita Vedanta : philosophical foundations and deconstructive strategies -- Sources of the tradition -- Upaniads that art thou (Tat Tvam Asi) -- Gauapda (c.7th century) : no bondage, no liberation -- Aakara (c.7th-8th (...) century) : there is no apprehender different from this apprehension to apprehend it -- Modern and contemporary masters -- Ramana Maharshi (1879-1950) : who am I? -- H.W.L Poonja (1910-1997) : you have to do nothing to be who you are! -- Gangaji (b. 1942) : you are that! -- Advaita Vedanta summary : nothing ever happens -- Zen Buddhism : philosophical foundations and deconstructive strategies -- Sources of the tradition -- The Lakvatra Sutra and the Vajracchedik Prajñpramit Sutra all things ... are not independent of each other and not two -- Ngrjuna (c.113-213) : Sasra is Nirva -- Eihei Dgen (1200-1253) : if I am already enlightened, why must I practice -- Contemporary masters -- Ekai Korematsu (b. 1948) : return to the spine -- Hgen Yamahata (b. 1935) : why not now -- Zen Buddhism summary : neither being nor non-being is to be taken hold of -- Deconstructive techniques and dynamics of experiential undoing -- Deconstructive techniques common to both traditions -- The teacher-student dynamic -- Key deconstructive techniques -- Unfindability analysis -- Bringing everything back to the here and now -- Paradoxical problems -- Negation -- Dynamics of experiential undoing -- Non-dual experiential space -- Experiential mapping : practitioners in the space -- Experiential undoing in Advaita Vedanta -- Experiential undoing in Zen Buddhism -- Conclusion: Deconstruction of reified awareness. (shrink)

The path of devotion (bhakti-mārga) is firmly rooted in duality, whereas the path of knowledge (jñāna-mārga), particularly in the Advaita tradition, establishes non-duality. Thus, the two streams seem to be quite divergent in nature, having no connection with each other. The present paper examines the pivotal role of bhakti in Advaita Vedānta, with a specific focus on Svāmī Vidyāraṇya’s elucidations. It explores the intrinsic connection between the paths of devotion and knowledge, highlighting their substantial role in the attainment (...) of mokṣa within the framework of the Advaita tradition. It also delineates the concept of bhakti, as laid down in the Bhaktisūtras, tracing its origins in the Vedas, and investigates its significance in the philosophy of Advaita Vedānta. The primary objective of the paper is to examine how Vidyāraṇya’s interpretation of jñāna and bhakti underscores their interconnectedness in unique ways. A careful study of his exposition makes us clearly realise that the two paths are only complementary and that they only converge and not diverge. (shrink)

The common conception is that philosophy is an armchair endeavour. For many (Žižek 2023), the task of philosophy is just to provide the right kinds of questions to the sciences upon which they can develop further tools etc. The research will aim to show that it is not just the right kind of questions that philosophy can provide, instead, it can provide practical solutions as well. The research paper will primarily aim to showcase a methodology for addiction recovery based on (...) the philosophy of Advaita Vedanta, which can be broadly applied to most kinds of addiction. The biggest problem with most kinds of addiction treatment programmes is relapse. So, can we devise a methodology which not only cures the problem of addiction but also provides aid in refraining from subsequent relapse? (shrink)

This is a doctoral thesis in the Department of Philosophy of the Madras University. Central to Indian philosophical thought is Mukti or liberation from the present state of ignorance and bondage. But the positive meaning of this liberation is not conceived in the same way by all Indian schools. In the first part of the book the author examines the opinions of various Indian schools other than Vedanta, including Buddhism and Jainism. The second part explains the point of (...) class='Hi'>Advaita Vedanta, the chief exponent of which is Sankara. For Advaita or Non-Dualism Brahman is the unique, infinite and immutable reality; Finite beings are maya or unreal beside the absolute reality of Brahman. They have only a relative and practical reality for human life until Mukti or liberation is attained in the realization that Brahman is the real self of all and the world of finite beings ceases to have any further meaning. All religious exercises are only means towards this final realization. On the whole the book is a synthesis of metaphysics from the Indian, especially non-dualistic, point of view. Twelve pages of Errata at the end of the book do little honor to the printers and publishers of the Madras University Philosophical Series.—J. K. (shrink)

Advaita Vedanta is the most refined philosophical pearl of Hinduism. It is reserved for seekers of Truth who want to know their own essence and aspire to liberation, or mokṣa. It suggests following the path of knowledge, called jñāna-yoga, which is more an existential view than a theory, philosophy, doctrine, or deductive logical knowledge. It teaches self-inquiry: "Who am I?" This question is an expression of the highest and noblest rebellion. It restores our dignity and accepts us as (...) the only authority on who we are. Jñāna is knowing ourselves as Brahman and realizing our reality as the transcendental Self, beyond time and space. In this book, Prabhuji presents the principles of Vedanta that will help seekers take their first steps on this path. Rather than offering information, explanations, and answers, he inspires us to inquire, doubt, and investigate our own essence. He tells us that every effort to achieve enlightenment is superfluous because we already are what we aspire to be. We simply need to turn our attention to consciousness itself and be the Self. (shrink)

The combination of panpsychism and priority monism leads to priority cosmopsychism, the view that the consciousness of individual sentient creatures is derivative of an underlying cosmic consciousness. It has been suggested that contemporary priority cosmopsychism parallels central ideas in the Advaita Vedānta tradition. The paper offers a critical evaluation of this claim. It argues that the Advaitic account of consciousness cannot be characterized as an instance of priority cosmopsychism, points out the differences between the two views, and suggests an (...) alternative positioning of the Advaitic canon within the contemporary debate on monism and panpsychism. (shrink)

This book provides an in-depth analysis of the doctrines of early Advaita Vedanta and Indian Mahayana Buddhism in order to examine the origins of Vedanta.

The metaphysical vision of Advaita Vedānta has been making its way into some corners of Western analytic philosophy, and has especially garnered attention among those philosophers who are seeking to develop metaphysical systems in opposition to both reductionist materialism and dualism. Given Vedānta’s monistic view of consciousness, it might seem natural to put Vedānta in dialogue with the growing position of panpsychism which, although not fully monistic, similarly takes mind to be a fundamental feature of reality. This paper will (...) evaluate to what extent Śaṅkara’s monism can bypass the most pressing issues facing panpsychism, namely combination and individuation problems. As will be seen in this paper, while Advaita Vedānta is able to avoid some of the panpsychist problems, it struggles ultimately to ontologically ground illusion in a coherent manner. As a result, a conclusion of this paper is that although Śaṅkara’s vision offers a promising route for those philosophers who take consciousness to be fundamental – including panpsychists – it cannot be uncritically adopted due to the problem of grounding Illusion. (shrink)